Between its decades long war with Eritrea, stalled battle with Tigrayan rebels, escalating tensions with Amhara militias, and rising domestic ethnic tensions, one would think that Ethiopia would seek to avoid further conflict. Facing only its current problems, some 2.1 million people are internally displaced fleeing famine, violence, or both. Hundreds of instances of human rights abuses against civilians, both by government forces and by rebel groups, paint a bleak picture. It would seem that, despite the high hopes held for him by the international community in the wake of his 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has not lived up to his reputation. 

Despite these issues, however, Ahmed’s government is intent to power through for the sake of what appears to be its overarching goal: restoring in part, or perhaps even in full, Ethiopia’s port access. In fact, it may be these domestic issues that drive Ahmed toward ever more ambitious means to acquire a port for the sake of political deflection. When Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1991, it took the port of Assab and with it the entirety of Ethiopia’s coastline. Arguably, this loss of port access has defined modern Ethiopian political ambitions more so than any other factor. Was Ethiopia’s 2020 escalation against Tigrayan factions truly a move to bring about political unity and stem Tigrayan independence movements, or rather, was it laying the foundations for a more stable border with Eritrea close to the sea? Has Ethiopia’s friendliness toward Eritrea and Djibouti truly been motivated by reconciliation, or because the cost of using hostile ports to import its necessities had become too high? 

These costs, approximately $1.6 billion per year, are what Ethiopia pays to its neighbors for access to their ports. Given that 90% of the nation’s critical trade comes via international shipping, this not only imposes an exorbitant cost but creates a logistical and strategic nightmare: beyond the $1.6 billion, Ethiopia pays untold millions internally transporting shipped goods throughout the country from a single point of entry. Furthermore, with the capital of Addis Ababa being supplied principally from one railway, only a single point of failure in a foreign country threatens the nation’s largest city. 

But how exactly does Ethiopia’s quest for reestablishing port access threaten regional stability? The Eritrean War is unlikely to resume, and an invasion of Djibouti would inevitably result in an international incident, one the Ahmed administration would likely seek to avoid. However, Ethiopia has recently been focusing on the port of Berbera, located east of Djibouti in Somaliland. To this end, in January of 2024, Ethiopia released an unprecedented Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland’s governing body out of the city of Hargeisa, stating that in exchange for a 50-year lease on the Berbera port, a 50-year lease on 12.5 miles of coastline for both commercial and naval use, and the right to establish a naval base, Ethiopia would begin considerations for officially recognizing Somaliland as an independent nation. While the deal has not yet been signed by Ethiopia, its mere existence presents an obvious problem: Somaliland is internationally recognized as a province of Somalia, with no nation recognizing it as an independent state capable of conducting its own foreign policy.

Somalia, naturally, was outraged at the deal, calling it a violation of sovereignty and stating that it would never cede “one inch” of territory in allowing Somaliland to become independent. The history between Somalia and Somaliland is complex: however, in the present day, Somaliland is de facto independent. The Mogadishu-based government has next to no authority in Somaliland’s territory, and the Somaliland government issues its own passports, collects its own taxes, and holds its own elections. Interestingly, Somaliland, while not necessarily stable, is a far more effective government than Somalia, which is still plagued with relatively far worse economic and security conditions. As such, Somalia on its own could do little but protest the Memorandum of Understanding. However, the risk of escalation comes from Egypt, especially in the wake of its defense pact with Somalia.

Egypt and Ethiopia have had a rocky relationship, defined by the latter’s insistence on constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, or GERD. The GERD is the crown jewel of Ethiopian infrastructure: it is estimated to provide about half of the nation’s power, contributing electricity to half of all the nation’s powered homes. Powering the massive turbines, however, requires immense amounts of water, which in turn necessitates a large reservoir. Egypt, far downstream at the Nile Delta with an extreme reliance on its waters for both agriculture and drinking, views the dam as an “existential threat.” While both nations participated in negotiations, ultimately the dam was built without concern for Egypt’s demands. It’s no surprise, therefore, that Egypt and Somalia, along with Eritrea, have signed a comprehensive defense agreement facilitating weapons transfers, joint training, and counterterrorism operations. This puts Ethiopia in an awkward position: it has thousands of troops based in Somalia as part of an African Union peacekeeping mission, troops Somalia has threatened to expel unless Ethiopia withdraws from its agreement with Somaliland. 

Clearly, the general risks arising from this situation are grave. Even if Egypt and Ethiopia do not enter into a military conflict, their spat over Somalia has indirectly reduced African Union cooperation against Al-Shabaab. Additionally, Ethiopia’s belligerence in trying to acquire port access has alienated its neighbors, pushing them closer to each other and to Egypt as a guarantor of security. In this way, Ethiopia has drawn itself into a box: it has exhausted the diplomatic patience of its potential port options, leaving only drastic actions on the table. Furthermore, political theory dictates that should Ethiopia’s domestic struggles get worse, either through its spiraling economy or escalating internal wars, it will become more belligerent in trying to achieve a win, to control a port.. Hence, an unfortunate effect is achieved: the likelihood of Ethiopian military aggression increases, while its smaller neighbors simultaneously build up alliance networks to deter hostile action on the threat of bringing in Egypt. It need not even be Ethiopia to fire the first shot: perhaps Somalia, sensing Ethiopian weakness, moves against Somaliland, or Eritrea seeks to impose a forced negotiated settlement to further secure its border. All these, although yet unlikely, are classic recipes for a regional war. 

What would such a conflict look like? Even at a limited scale, the devastation would be extreme. One can look at Ethiopia’s historic conflict with Eritrea, its recent conflict in Tigray, and its ongoing fight against FANO militias as examples of what might occur on a larger scale. The region is rife with various ethnic groups with historic disputes over land, power, and political representation, many of which would inevitably be inflamed. However, to speak as if such occurrences, based in theory, will have practical outcomes is speculation. Steps have been taken to avoid any sort of conflict. In particular, Turkey, arguably the region’s reserved superpower, has been mediating talks between Egypt and Ethiopia. Turkey’s interests, both economic and military, are present throughout the region, and the nation has a clear incentive towards maintaining the peace. 

There are further steps the international community can take to reduce the chance of conflict. Namely, aid should be given to help the Ahmed regime mitigate its internal crises, in this way reducing the Ethiopian imperative to reclaim a port as a means of freeing the country of its problems. Additionally, further negotiations should be conducted through the African Union, ensuring negotiations are fruitful and in compliance with any agreed upon terms. However, predicting the future to any degree is dubious, and only one thing is evidently clear: the current geopolitical alignments emerging in the Horn of Africa lend themselves to conflict, with concerning incentive structures common to regional wars.