For many around the world, it’s a hauntingly familiar story. On Jan. 8, 2023, crowds of protestors stormed Brazil’s capital buildings, enraged by the loss of ‘rightful leader’ Jaír Bolsonaro, leader of the nation’s conservative Liberal Party (PL), in the 2022 election. Brazilian police and army were able to successfully remove protestors that day, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the left-wing Workers Party, also known as Lula, took his place as the 39th president.  However, a new election is approaching in 2026 and one thing is certain: the bitter power struggle between the two Populist leaders in Brazil is far from over. 

The 2022 election was the first instance in which Lula and Bolsonaro faced off directly at the polls. However, recent elections have demonstrated their dominance over the political scene in Brazil. Brazil is a democracy composed of three government branches: the legislature represented by the National Congress, the independent judiciary led by the Supreme Court, and the executive branch headed by the president. Brazil also has a diverse multi-party system. 23 different political parties currently have representation in the country’s National Congress. Yet, this diversity has not been reflected in the executive branch in recent years. Between the two of them, Lula and Bolsonaro have held the presidency for 14 of the last 22 years. Lula himself had served two terms as the president from 2003-2011, and Bolsonaro served from 2019-2023. The presidencies of both men have marked a distinct shift away from popular support for the parties and the issues they embody and towards popular support for the candidate themselves. 

Brazil is just one country caught in a global swing toward Populism. But what is Populism, and why is it on the rise? Michael L. Conniff, historian and one of the premier authors on Populism in Latin America, defines Populism as “an expansive style of election campaigning by colorful and engaging politicians who could draw masses of new voters into their movements and hold their loyalty indefinitely, even after their deaths.” Standouts in this global trend include American president, Donald Trump, and Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In Brazil’s case, both Lula and Bolsonaro have had the Populist label applied to them, and it has made for a contentious couple of years in Brazilian politics. 

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Lula  

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was first elected to the Brazilian presidency in 2002. Lula originated from humble beginnings, being the seventh of eight children who had to contend with famine and drought in one of the poorest agricultural districts in Brazil. However, it is this humble beginning that allowed Lula to fulfill one of the most common definitions of a Populist leader: an alignment with the disenfranchised, usually the working class. Scholars observe that Lula’s followers originate mostly from the working class and similarly poor districts, indicating that they may see in him a reflection of their own values and needs.  

Indeed, Lula’s rise to popularity occurred during Brazil’s ABC Metalworker’s Strike, in which he performed “miraculous deeds” as a negotiator for the workers. This characteristic of divinity stuck, and his political career was launched by his charisma and claims of his supporters that he is uniquely blessed to lead the Brazilian people. These types of claims are a hallmark of a Populist leader, Coniff argues in Chapter 2 of his book, Populism in Latin America.    

Lula embodies a brand of left-wing Populism that focuses on specifically class antagonism. Supported by his own history of defending the working class, Lula uses his political platform to advocate against “big business” and “finance capital.” The IMF and the United States are common targets for Lula’s critiques. These calls have resonated with Brazilian voters in the past, resulting in his being elected for a third presidential term in 2022. 

In 2025, however, two years into this term, Lula’s popularity is dropping. The president, who was hailed as “freedom” and “the return of democracy” during interviews with supporters the night of his most recent election is now struggling in the polls. Midterm polls show that 47% of Brazilian voters approve of Lula’s performance as president, down from his 52% approval rate from December. The droppings rates occur amid widespread dissatisfaction with the government’s attempt to increase oversight of Brazil’s popular online payment system, and may be fueled by a rumor that the government would impose a tax on such payments, something Lula’s administration denies. In addition, there are increasing health concerns about the 79 year old, especially after an emergency brain surgery in December due to a fall in his home.  

This is not the first time that Lula has been counted out. In 2017, Lula was tried and convicted on corruption charges. The investigation was part of a much larger investigation, “Operation Car Wash,” which has charged over 200 people with money laundering in connection with the state-owned petrol and gas company, Petrobrás. Lula was not the president at the time of his conviction and began serving the 12 year sentence. His political supporters called the decisions a result of “political and economic” interests. Although the case was annulled in 2021 due to procedural errors, Lula’s approval rates never again reached his pre-imprisonment numbers.    

Despite concerns from constituents, Lula has announced his intention to seek re-election in 2026. The decision has provoked mixed reactions among members and allies of the Workers’  Party, as Lula has also announced his intention to find a ‘successor.’ Potential candidates originate from Lula’s own cabinet, including his Finance Minister Fernando Haddad, Education Minister Camilo Santana, and Chief of Staff Office Rui Costa. None have the full support of the Party. Support for Haddad has suffered this year, as his calls to cut government spending have conflicted with the agendas of other members of Lula’s inner circle. Santana and Costa are among the cabinet members who opposed Haddad’s calls to re-focus on fiscal policy and limit federal spending, placing them at odds with the Brazilian peoples’ concerns of inflation.   

Even with the discussion surrounding these potential candidates, a common concern is clear: regardless of his decreasing approval ratings, none of the potential candidates loom quite as large as Lula. “None of the three [potential candidates] are prepared,” insisted a prominent member of Lula’s party. The Workers Party, whom Lula has led since his election in 2002, insists that he is their sole candidate for 2026.  

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Bolsonaro  

Meanwhile, Jaír Bolsonaro, the former 38th president of Brazil, has a much different approach to Populist rhetoric. A political elite himself, Bolsonaro rose to power through a military career and served several terms in Brazil’s Congress. In spite of this, Bolsonaro fits the right-wing narrative of a Populist by situating himself in opposition to political and socio-cultural corruption or alleged corruption. For instance, Bolsonaro repeatedly blamed the setbacks of his presidency on infiltration from the Worker’s Party into his government, mobilized his supporters against the Supreme Court and Federal Judges that opposed him, and condemned artists and celebrities that didn’t support him for their ‘corruption of values.’

 Beyond his attacks on institutions, Bolsonaro’s emotionally-charged appeals fit the right-wing Populist definition, as they often find their basis in othering, xenophobia, sexism, and neo-nationalism, a movement to restore a state to an era of former glory by resisting globalism and other outside influences. Past Bolsonaro remarks to this effect include a claim that a female political opponent was not worthy of being raped by him, an assertion that some indigenous Brazilans and those of Afro-descent are unfit to procreate, and a claim the nation’s past military dictatorship’s only shortcoming was it hadn’t killed more people. These claims find their audience in young men, religious Christian Brazilians, middle-class women, and pro-market business elites. 

However, it was these claims that cost him the 2024 presidency, and perhaps the 2026 one as well. After his loss in 2022, Bolsonaro used government communication channels to cast doubts on the electronic voting system, strongly implying that the election was stolen from him. 

In 2023, Brazil’s Supreme Court concluded that Bolsonaro abused his power, and ruled that he is barred from running for office until 2030. Justice Alexandre de Moraes, one of the members of the Supreme Court that voted against Bolsonaro, claimed that the Court’s decision was a rejection of “populism reborn from the flames of hateful, antidemocratic speech that promotes heinous disinformation.” As for Bolsonaro’s role in the attempted coup, an investigation remains open. 

Bolsonaro closed out his presidency with around 45% of Brazilians disapproving of his performance, and 26% somewhat approving and somewhat disapproving. However, despite losing majority acceptance and his conviction, Bolsonaro retains the loyalty of many supporters. Thousands gathered in Rio to support him, as he appeared before Brazil’s court on March 25th in connection with his actions that led to the 2022 coup. The country’s top Court decided at this time that the former president would stand trial for his role in the insurrection. While there have been no formal polls to estimate the former president’s chances in the upcoming 2026 election, it is clear that Bolsonaro retains a prominent place in voters’ minds. 

Despite his conviction and looming sentencing, many still fear that Bolsonaro will ignore the order. Indeed, the Liberal Party (PL), the party that backed Bolsonaro’s first presidency, has implied that they still plan to run him as their candidate in 2026. The path forward for Bolsonaro is far from clear. However, certain steps have been taken already, including calls to pardon the January 8th protestors and a lawsuit from the United States by the judge overseeing Bolsonaro’s case. 

 In the meantime, the party has tentatively put forth names such as Tarcisio de Freita, governor of Brazil’s most populous state, as a possible second choice. When Costa Neto, head of the PL, was asked whether de Freitas may be the new hope of the Brazilian right, the party leader replied that it was up to Bolsonaro.  

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The Men of the People? 

It is possible that for the second time since the two met in the 2022 election, there will be an election between two enormously beloved and Populist leaders. The first election led to an attempted coup and a presidential ban. The second shows early signs that it may be just as bitter. Brazil is one such case that puts the danger of Populism on full display. The same charisma and rhetoric that make Lula and Bolsonaro beloved by their supporters, makes them abhorrent to the other side. It is uncommon enough to have one formerly indicted president, but a second is unheard of. In a healthier democracy, this may serve as an indicator that both candidates are past their prime, but in Brazil, neither party is willing to run, or even necessarily have, a Plan B. In a situation such as this, it is necessary to remember the observations of Populism experts like Conniff: these leaders amass loyalty “even after their deaths.” A perhaps unforeseen consequence of the Bolsonaro-Lula rematch is that these candidates are drawing support even away from their own colleagues and party. 

Whatever the outcome of the 2026 election, Brazil’s case illustrates a noteworthy side effect of the Populism wave: with political power concentrated onto individuals, there is no one left to take their place when they’re gone. 

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