The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon

Historical Background

The Syrian refugee crisis is widely known as the largest humanitarian displacement crisis in the world. After a violent government crackdown on public demonstrations in 2011, the country descended into a civil war that forced millions of Syrian families to flee their homes. Over 14 million people have been displaced within and outside of Syria since March 2011. The majority of Syrian refugees have sought safety in neighboring countries, with Turkey hosting the largest refugee population by a single country worldwide: over 3 million. Lebanon has also received a large influx; approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees live in the country. Hosting this community has placed a burden on Lebanon’s available resources, exposing the inability of Lebanese politicians to provide basic services or jobs to their own citizens. Lebanese leaders have accused Syrian refugees of taking Lebanese jobs, though the World Bank found this claim to be untrue. The social treatment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has also deteriorated as frustration grows with a financial crisis that started in October 2019 and was exacerbated by Covid and the Port of Beirut explosion in August 2020. In fact, the Spring 2021 Lebanon Economic Monitor found that Lebanon’s financial crisis ranks among the worst economic crises globally since the mid-nineteenth century. Mobs of angry Lebanese citizens have violently attacked Syrians, forcing many refugees to hide in their homes.

Additionally, Syrian refugees have increasingly been subjected to severe restrictions by the Lebanese government. Interior Minister Bassam Mawlawi ordered municipalities to check Syrians’ papers and close shops and businesses that employ undocumented Syrians. This crackdown is exacerbating Lebanon’s economic woes, as many parts of the Lebanese economy cannot function without the work of Syrian refugees. According to the Arab Center in Washington, DC, Syrians can be considered the “backbone of the low-wage labor force” in Lebanon. Unfortunately, both citizens and leaders alike have been influenced by misleading generalizations that fail to distinguish between refugees fleeing regime oppression and those seeking work without complying with labor laws. Therefore, Syrian refugees have faced marginalization and exploitation since the arrival of the first wave in 2011. Most Syrians are active contributors to Lebanese society; they should not be used as a political pawn to distract from Lebanon’s economic problems, nor as a cover to hide corruption in Lebanese executive and political administrations.

Recent Developments

In the past year, a new humanitarian crisis began unfolding at Lebanon's border with Syria as citizens of various nationalities continue to flee Israeli shelling linked to the war in Gaza. Displaced for the umpteenth time, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are now struggling to find shelter amid bombardment in a country which has banned refugee camps. Anti-refugee sentiment has also surged particularly in recent months, and Lebanese security forces have stepped up deportations of Syrians. Notably, there is a complicated history of reciprocal refuge between Syria and Lebanon. Each country has, at various points, been a refuge for citizens of the other, which challenges the simple binaries often associated with the refugee experience. This truth contradicts the portrayal of Syrian displacement by some Lebanese leaders as one-directional, and the inherent framing of Syrian refugees as the sole recipients of aid sent by the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU).

In September 2024, hostilities between Israel and Lebanese militant group Hezbollah sharply escalated alongside Israel’s bombing of civilian areas across Lebanon. The bombardment has created a profound humanitarian disaster; over one million people (one-fifth of Lebanon’s population) have been displaced from their homes—an unprecedented rate of displacement. In fact, over 100,000 people have fled to Syria from Lebanon in an effort to escape Israeli air raids. Not to be confused with return, this movement represents a reversal of the refugee flow that occurred in 2011. It is also emblematic of a broader pattern of cyclical displacement crises in the region, and a further example of reciprocal refuge between Syria and Lebanon. A quarter of Lebanon is now under Israeli military evacuation orders, and many municipal shelters are effectively Lebanese-only due to rising xenophobic sentiment against Syrians. Exclusion from shelters only exacerbates the difficulty of accessing food, clean water, medical care, and other needs. Clearly, Syrian refugees are among the most vulnerable communities within this crisis. Families who cannot afford to leave Lebanon must stay and risk the threat posed by an expanding war. The psychological toll on Syrian refugees is severe: they recall the trauma of previous experience living under bombardment and the harsh conditions of their first displacement, while facing similar circumstances yet again.

To the shock of many, Syria’s long-standing Assad regime fell on December 8, 2024 to the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Shams (HTS). The opposition was mostly composed of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, a force present in the Syrian Civil War since its 2011 inception. Millions of Syrians now have a chance to return home and provide a balance against armed militia groups and radicalism. Conversely, such a significant influx of people will likely add to the burden of an already weak economy and labor market. The opposing forces have promised amnesty and autonomy to Syrian civilians, though time will tell if they back their words with action. Former al-Qaeda leader Ahmed al-Sharaa and leader of HTS has declared himself interim president. He announced the formation of a legislative council to govern until a new constitution is made. However, it remains unclear whether Syria's rebel factions will cooperate and communication to the public has been limited. Thus, optimism should remain cautious.

Should instability continue in Syria, it will undoubtedly continue to bleed into Lebanon and beyond. Additionally, outsiders near and far will likely hyper-charge battles on behalf of favored groups—as seen in recent years in Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia. Importantly, it is currently unclear whether the new Syria will remain fractured or become one united state. A fractured Syria carries significant risks of no-governance zones and fertile ground for violent extremists such as Islamic State. Overall, the world is watching closely to determine whether the rebels now in power will be able to stabilize the country, or if Syria will become a power vacuum.

Implications

The enormity of this crisis begs curiosity regarding the role of the U.S., United Nations (UN), and other global powers in supporting refugees and their host countries. Lebanon needs help dealing with the economic and social well being of both Lebanese citizens and Syrian guests, as millions of people are currently relying on aid and community networks to survive. Work also must be done on the global level to improve the shelter options available to Syrian refugees, the rights of refugees, and the parameters of host countries. Overall, there are many ways for countries with resources to aid Lebanon, Syria, and surrounding regions facing conflict. However, the U.S. and EU are grappling with declining influence due to their decreased funding to the Lebanese government and a lack of true burden sharing: the EU has historically violated refugee rights by forcibly returning migrants without due process, and the U.S. is notoriously difficult to seek refuge in—especially for citizens of Middle Eastern countries. These factors leave the U.S. and EU with less leverage, which can embolden Lebanon to act as it chooses. Additionally, a globally deteriorating level of respect for refugee rights is at play, driven by factors such as a rise in statelessness, overwhelmed asylum systems, and risks to major migration routes.

Though it is uncertain whether Lebanon, the EU, and the U.S. will ever implement these plausible solutions, there are various ideas on how to formulate a realistic and successful plan for Syrian refugees. Lebanese officials could reform regulations in order to properly assess who is a refugee and who is a migrant. This would allow for specialized pathways for each group to seek work visas in Lebanon or to have protected refugee status. Next, both Lebanese and Syrian individuals would benefit from increased support services for at-risk children and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Refugees also desperately need access to legal aid to obtain documentation and legal residency. Those without proper documentation run a high risk of deportation, yet it is incredibly difficult to obtain residency papers—even for those who meet all qualifications—as Lebanese authorities have imposed regulations that effectively bar many refugees from obtaining or renewing residency permits. The process of deportations represents another large opportunity for reform. Forced deportations breach the international law principle of nonrefoulment: not to forcibly return people to countries where they face a clear risk of torture or other persecution. Syrian refugees who returned to Syria between 2017 and 2021 from Lebanon and Jordan faced grave human rights abuses and persecution at the hands of the Syrian government, proving clear risk. Today, there likely remain elements of dangerous power structures from the recent decades of vice-like Assad regime control. Thus, governments providing funding to Lebanon could pressure the Lebanese military to end forced deportations. Governments could also demand that Lebanon allow an independent reporting mechanism to ensure that funding does not contribute to human rights violations.

To conclude, the only way to repatriate Syrian refugees to Syria is to provide a secure and stable environment for their return. Though the fall of the Assad dynasty helps matters, safe repatriation will not happen unless current Syrian leaders allow for a democratic transition. This would enable Syrians to rebuild their country, possibly by drafting a new constitution and preparing to hold elections. There are many actions that Lebanon and other countries can take to lessen the plight of Syrian refugees—even modest U.S. contributions would greatly increase the likelihood of a successful transition. Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for the future of this group is in the hands of their own government. The birth of a new Syria will invariably be painful, frustrating, and represent an opportunity for a new beginning. Looking forward, scholars anticipate large implications of this power shift, such as the rekindling of popular revolutionary spirit across the globe.